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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. FARRELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-_vs.-
THE MENNEN COMPANY, a corporation, 
SMITH-FAUS DRUG COMPANY, a cor-
poration, ZIONS CO-OPERATIVE MER-
CANTILE INSTITUTION, a corporation, 
WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY, a corpo-
ration, and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7461 
This is an action to enjoin and permanently restrain 
the above named defendants from selling any hair tonic or 
skin lotion or other toilet article in the State of Utah 
under any trade name using the word uBracer" or other-
wise infringing upon appellant's trade name. ~B~ace For 
The Hair, A Real- Bracer For The Hair." On October 1, 
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1949 the appellant :filed in the office of the Clerk of the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah a duly verified complaint 
(R. 1-6) against the above named defendants reading as 
follows: 
uThe above named plaintiff complains of the 
above named defendants and for a cause of action 
alleges: 
ul. That defendant The Mennen Company is 
now, and was at all times herein mentioned, a cor-
poration, duly organized and existing under and by 
virtue of the laws of the State of New Jersey; and 
that said defendant is now engaged in the manu-
facture of a certain skin lotion known as uskin 
Bracer" and the distribution of the same in . the 
State of Utah; and that said defendant is now do-
ing business in the State of Utah. 
c:t2. That defendants Smith-Faus Drug Com-
pany and Zions Co-operative Mercantile Institu-
tion are now, and were at all times herein men-
tioned, corporations, duly organized and existing 
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah 
with their principal place of business located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; and that both of said 
defendants are now engaged in operating wholesale 
drug companies in Salt Lake City, Utah, and that 
as such both of said defendants sell and distribute 
in the State of Utah the afore-mentioned skin lo-
tion under the trade name of uSkin Bracer." 
u3. That defendant Walgreen Drug Company 
is no'Y", and was at all times herein mentioned, a cor-
poration, duly organized and existing under and by 
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah; and that 
said defendant was and is engaged in operating re-
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tail drug stores throughout the State of Utah, and 
that in the course of this said retail drug business 
said defendant has sold and is selling the afore-men-
tioned skin lotion under the trade name of uSkin 
Bracer." 
((4. That defendant John Doe is the fictitious 
name of a defendant unknown who is now engaged 
in the wholesale drug business in the State of Utah 
and is selling said skin lotion under the trade name 
of ((Skin Bracer" in the State of Utah, and that 
when his true name is discovered, plaintiff asks tha~ 
this complaint may be amended by inserting such 
true name in the place and stead of such fictitious 
name. 
us. That plaintiff is now, and has been at all 
times herein mentioned, an actual and bona-fide 
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, en-
gaged in the extensive and profitable business of 
manufacturing and selling, wholesale and retail, a 
certain hair tonic and skin lotion in the State of 
Utah which is an original formula conceived by 
plaintiff; that in said business the plaintiff pur-
chases the many and varied ingredients used in the 
manufacture of the said hair tonic and skin lotion 
and mixes them according to his said formula, and 
bottles and labels the product and sells the same 
to barbershops and customers throughout the State 
of Utah and uses the same in connection with a cer-
tain barbershop owned and operated by plaintiff 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, wherein said product is 
manufactured, under the trade name of uBrace 
For the Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair"; that by 
reason of the competent and efficient manner in 
which plaintiff has always conducted and does con-
duct his said business, the said hair tonic and skin 
lotion has acquired and now commands an exten-
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sive patronage in the State of Utah under the said 
trade name of ((Brace For The Hair, A Real Bracer 
For the Hair/' an.d plaintiff has acquired and now 
has a goodwill in said business under said trade name 
of great value. 
u6. That in accordance with the laws and 
statutes of the State of Utah, the·n and now in ef-
fect, plaintiff did on, or about, the 31st day of 
August, 19 2 5, file of record in the office of the 
Secretary of State of the State of Utah his registra· 
tion of the said trade name, uBrace For The Hair, 
A Real Bracer For The Hair," and said registration 
is now, and has been at all times since said date of 
filing, of full legal force and effect; and that a copy 
of said registration, certified by the office of the 
Secretary of State of the State of Utah, is attached 
hereto, marked uExhibit A," and by reference 
made a part of this complaint. 
u7. That for sometime last past the defendant 
The Mennen Company has been manufacturing the 
aforesaid skin lotion under the said trade name of 
uSkin Bracer" and that all of the defendants, in-
cluding The Mennen Company, have been selling 
and distributing the said skin lotion in the State of 
Utah under the trade name of uSkin Bracer." That 
by using a trade name so similar to that trade name 
long used 'by plaintiff for his skin lotion and hair 
tonic defendants have appropriated to their own 
use and benefit the goodwill of plaintiff's business 
and deluded the plaintiff's customers and the public 
in general into the belief that the product manu-
factured and sold by plaintiff and the product sold 
by defendants are one and the same article· and 
. ' that 1f defendants continue to sell a skin lotion in 
the State of Utah with the word uBracer" in the 
trade name, the customers and prospective custom-
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,., 
v 
ers of the plaintiff and the public in general will at 
all times be deceived, misled and defrauded into be-
lieving the article sold by defendants is the same 
article as that which is manufactured and sold by 
plaintiff. 
tt8. That plaintiff has repeatedly made demand 
upon the defendant The ~1ennen Company to 
cease and desist from encroaching and infringing 
upon the duly registered trade name of the plain-
tiff in the State of Utah, and said defendant has re-
fused and failed to heed said warnings. That un-
less restrained the defendants will continue and 
proceed to carry on their business of selling a skin 
lotion under the said trade name which encroaches 
upon the registered trade name of the plaintiff as 
afore-mentioned; that said acts of defendants have 
created and will continue to create much confusion 
in plaintiff,s said business; and that plaintiff has no 
adequate remedy at law. 
((WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays, judgment that 
defendants, and each of them, be enJoined and re-.. 
strained permanently from selling any hair tonic 
or skin lotion or other toilet article in the State of 
Utah under any trade name using the word uBrac-
er" or otherwise infringing upon plaintiff,s afore-
said trade name, and that plaintiff have such other 
and further relief as to the Court may seem proper, 
and that plaintiff have his costs incurred herein. 
/sl JOHN HAYS O,DONNELL 
lsi RAYMOND R. BRADY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff." 
A copy of the filed appellant's application for the 
mentioned trade name with a certificate from the Secretary 
of State's Office, for Utah, showing that the application 
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was a true, full and ~correct copy, was marked as uExhibit 
A" and attached to the complaint (R. 5-6) and to each 
of the three copies of the complaint served upon each of 
the three respondents. 
Only the respondents, Smith-Faus Drug Company, 
Zions Co-operative Mercantile Institution and Walgreen 
Drug Company, were ever served properly and legally 
with a copy of the summons and the above-mentioned 
complaint. The Mennen Company and John Doe were 
not served properly with summons herein and have made 
no general appearance before the said District Court or any 
other court. Consequently, we mean only Smith-Faus 
Drug Company, Zions Co-operative Mercantile Institu-
tion and Walgreen Drug Company when we refer to the 
urespondents., 
On October 22nd, 1949, a demurrer (R. 7) was served 
upon appellant, through his counsel, and filed in Court, 
reading as follows: 
ucome now the defendants, Smith-Faus Drug 
Company, Zion's Co-operative Mercantile Institu-
tion, and Walgreen Drug Company, and demur to 
plaintiff's complaint herein, upon the ground that 
said complaint does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action." 
The said demurrer came on regularly for hearing, 
upon appellant's motion, before the Court, Honorable 
Roald A. Hogenson presiding as Judge, upon November 
8th, 1949. C. E. Henderson appeare·d and represent-
ed th~ three respondents at the hearing of the general 
demurrer. Mr. Henderson submitted three arguments 
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in support of his contention that the demur should be 
sustained, and these arguments were as follows: 
1. Mr. Henderson's self-styled main point was to 
cite the old general rule that a word or combination of 
words which are merely descriptive of the subject to 
which it is applied is not usually a good trade name. Then 
Mr. Henderson quoted from dictionaries showing that in 
the eighteenth century the word ubracer" meant a tonic. 
2. Mr. Henderson then argued that even though 
appellant's trade name was valid, appellant's registration 
of the same is only in connection with its use as a hair 
tonic and could not effect the respondents who are only 
in the skin lotion business. 
3. Mr. Henderson then argued that because appel-
lant's complaint had the afore-mentioned certificate 
marked uExhibi.t A" (R. 5-6) attached -to it and because of 
the allegations in paragraph six of the complaint (R. 2-3), 
the Court should not consider the doctrine of secondary 
meanings, and should only ove·rrule the demur if the appel-
lant's trade name is valid by reason of the same having 
been registered in accordance with law. 
The Court ordered the parties to submit written 
memoranda of authorities in support of their respective 
positions on the aforesaid three arguments, and, thereafter, 
the memoranda were submitted by the respective parties 
in accordance with the wishes of the Court. Thereafter, 
~ on December 20, 1949, the District Court entered its 
~ Order sustaining the respondents' demurrer. Naturally, 
~ neither party knows which of the three arguments of re-
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spondents, if any, influenced the Court when it sustained 
the demurrer. 
The appellant has alleged all facts in his complaint 
that he can· prove if granted a hearing or trial on questions 
of fact; conseque·ntly, the appellant cannot amend his com-
plaint, and, thus, he elected in writing (R. 8) to stand on 
the said complaint. On January 9, 1950 the District 
Court · entered its judgment (R. 9) herein reading as 
follows·: · ;,., -
· uin this action, the defendants, Smith-Faus 
Drug Company, Zions Co-operative Mercantile 
Institution and Walgreen Drug Company, having 
appear~d and demurred to the plaintiff's complaint 
herein, and the issues of law thereto arising having 
been fully argued and duly submitted to the court, 
and the court being fully advised in the premises, 
:_having entered its order herein on the 20th day of 
· December, 1949, sustaining said demurrer, and the 
plaintiff having ·elected to stand on his said com-
pl~int, 
uNow, on motion of C. E. Henderson, one of the 
, _ · · atto~neys for said demurring defendants, 
UIT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED, that the complaint herein be, and the 
··same is hereby dismissed. 
uEntered this 9th day of January, 1950. 
Is/ ROALD A. HOGENSON 
District Judge." 
The appellant has prosecuted this appeal from that 
. judgment and order. · 
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STATEMENT OF THE TWO POINTS UPON 
WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO REPLY FOR A 
REVERSAL OF THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS' DEMUR-
RER AND OF THE JUDGMENT HEREIN DIS-
MISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT . 
. 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT IS IN ERROR 
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE 
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE 
OF ACTION; AND, THUS, THE DISTRICT COURT 
IS IN ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE GENERAL 
DEMURRER OF THE DEFENDANTS AND RE-
SPONDENTS, SMITH- FAUS DRUG COMPANY, 
ZIONS CO-OPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITU-
TION AND WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS IN ERROR 
WHEN IT RENDERED AND ENTERED ITS OR-
DER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE HEREIN DIS-
MISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT. 
ERROR NUMBER ONE 
. THE DISTRICT COURT IS IN ERROR WHEN 
IT RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND APPEL-
LANT'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE FACTS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF AC-
TION; AND, THUS, THE DISTRICT COURT IS IN 
ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE GENERAL DEMUR-
RER O·F THE DEFENDANTS AND RESPOND-
ENTS, SMITH-FAUS DRUG COMPANY, ZIONS 
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CO-OPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITUTION 
AND WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY. 
ARGUMENT ON ERROR NUMBER ONE 
It is the contention of the appellant that the District 
Court, when it rendered its decision on the hearing of the 
said demurrer, misapplied the general rule, which we 
agree is followed in most jurisdictions, that a word or 
combination of words which is merely a generic term or 
descriptive of an article, or trade, or its composition, 
characteristics, or qualities cannot ordinarily be appro-
priated as a trademark or trade name to the exclusion of its 
use by others, for the one and only reason that to permit 
such exclusion would deny competitors the right to de-
scribe their goods and wares to the public. As with most 
general rules, this rule has many exceptions and the word 
in controversy, uBracer," comes within some of these ex-
ceptions. The District Court entered its Order sustaining 
respondents' demurrer, just eleven days before the ~ew 
rules of civil procedure for Utah Courts became effective. 
These new rules permit no demurrers. 
The respondents quoted to the District Court from a 
few dictionaries, which, in an attempt to impress ~heir 
readers with the exhaustive scope of the work, had in-
cluded among their definitions of the word ubracer," an 
old ·eighteenth century definition, to-wit: A utori.ic." 
However, all such dictionaries are careful to designate the 
simile for the word, ubracer," as obsolete, and very few 
smaller dictionaries even bother to mention this antiquated 
and long-forgotten meaning. We, herewith, cite for the 
Court's information from the dictionaries that we found 
10 
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I~ 
ustng the aforesaid antiquated definition of the word, 
((Bracer." 
Webster's New International Dictionary Of The 
English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged, for 1949, 
defines on page 322 as follows: 
uBracer. ( 1 ) That which braces, binds or 
makes firm; a brace. (2) One who braces, as in at-
taching uppers to soles or in boiler-works. (3a) 
Obsolete. A tonic or stimulant. {3b) Slang. A 
drink of liquor." 
The same dictionary on page 2665 de·fines as !ollows: 
uTonic. Pertaining to or characterized by 
tension, esp. muscular tension; hence, producing 
or adapted to produce healthy muscular condition 
and reaction." 
The same Dictionary on page 1461 defines as follows: 
((Lotion. Act Qf washing, ablution. Obso-
lete. A liquid medicinal preparation for washing; 
a wash." 
Volume 1 of the Oxford's New English Dictionary 
On Historical Principals, page 1043, published incidently 
in 18 8 8, even classifies the utonic" simile for the word 
bracer as obsolete at that time when it defines bracer as 
follows: 
u3. That which braces (the nerves) ; hence, a 
tonic medicine. (a common sense in the 18th cen-
tury, now obsolete)." 
Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary of the 
English Language defines on page 322 as follows: 
11 
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uBracer ( 1) That which braces, . binds, 
strengthens, steadies; a band. ( 2) Som_eth1ng to 
brace the nerves · a tonic ; a common use 1n theory, 
18th century, n~w slang for a morning drink. 
Now that we have shown that utonic'' is only an 
obsolete meaning for the word, ubracer," we cite from the 
Restatement of the Law and certain cases and authorities 
applying the rule that in .instances where a word or com-
bination of words has only an obsolete generic· or descrip-
tive meaning, as it pertains to the disputed product, the 
afore-mentioned ge·neral rule does not apply, for the reason 
that the word is not in fact generic or descriptive. Re-
statement Of The Law, Torts, Division 3, page 580, sec. 
72l{c): 
u (c) . A designation is not generic or descrip-
tive under the rule stated in this section,* if its 
generic or descriptive meaning is obsolete or is 
known only to philogists, lexicographers or per-
sons acquainted with curiosities of antiquity. Since 
the meaning is not known in the market, one's 
use of the designation as a trade-mark does not 
interfere with the efforts of other merchants to de-
scribe their goods. The test is the meaning attached 
to the· designation by prospective purchases, rather 
than the scientific meaning." ' 
*The rule mentioned in the above quotation 
is sec~ion 721 on page 579 of the same book read-
ing as follows: u.A designation cannot be a trade-
mark for goods if it is likely to be regarded by pro-
spective purchasers as a common name or generic 
name for such goods or as descriptive of them or 
their ingredients, quality, properties functions or 
" , uses. 
12 
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Using the test mentioned by the Restatement in sec-
tion 721 (c) we are convinced that a customer in a depart-
ment store would be referred to the· State Liquor Store and 
not the shaving-needs, hair tonics and cosmetic counter 
when this customer told the floor walker that he needed a 
ubracer." We believe further that no one would recog-
nize a product described only as a c:cbracer" as being a hair 
tonic or skin lotion; therefore, we argue that the appel-
lant's competitors are not injured when the State refuses 
to permit them to use the word ubracer" in connection 
with their respective products. In short, the ordinary 
man does not today confuse tonics and bracers as being 
the same article. 
We cite the following case and authorities which also 
apply the aforesaid exception to the said general rule: 
(.(.A word which has become obsolete, or which 
is not in general or common use, and is unintelligible 
and nondescriptive to the general public, though 
it may be known to linguists and scientists, may be 
regarded as arbitrary and fanciful, and capable of 
being used as a trademark or trade-name." Le-
Blume Import Co., Inc., vs. Coty, 293 F. 344. 
uAn obsolete word, or one unintelligible to the 
general public may be a trade-mark even though its 
technical meaning might otherwise forbid its 
use." 63 C.J. 345. 
Respondents cited to the District Court, in reply to 
our argument, Vol. 1 of Nims' ccUnfair Competition & 
Tradenames," page 558 wherein Mr. Nims disagrees with 
the LeBlume Import Co. vs. Coty (supra.) case and claims 
the case is not generally followed. However, the Restate-
ment, Corpus Juris and American Jurisprude·nce, among 
13 
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others, seem to disagree with Mr. Nims and the respond-
ents. We maintain that the Restatement and the other 
authorities are right, because no one is denied or hampered 
in his right to describe his product to the public, by a p-
plying the LeBlume Import Co. vs. Coty case cule. 
In order to prove that the word ubracer" is a proper 
subject for use as a trade name, we cite now various cases 
and authorities offering tests and guides as to what words 
can be restricted-we feel certain that the Court must 
apply each test favorable to the following question pre-
sented by this ,case: Is the word ubracer" as used in ap-
pellant's trade name, uBracer For The Hair, A Real Bracer 
For The Hair," capable of being ~ppropriated as a trade 
name for a combination hair tonic and skin lotion to the 
restriction of the use of the word by all appellant's com-
petitors and potential competitors in connection with their 
competing or potentially competing products? 
u.A word or combination of words which is 
merely descriptive of an article of trade, or its com-
position, ·characteristic, or qualities, cannot be ap-
propriated as a trademark to the exclusion of its 
use by others. This rule excluding descriptive 
terms has also been held to apply to tradenames. 
As to whether words employed fall within this 
prohibition, it is said that the true test is not 
whether they are exhaustively descriptive of the 
article designated, but whether in themselves, and 
as they are commonly used by those who under-
stand their meaning, they are reasonably indicative 
and descriptive of the thing intended." Vol. 52, 
Am. Jur., page 543. 
u.It has been held that words which are mere-
ly suggestive or only indirectly or remotely descrip-
14 
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tive of the composition, quality or characteristics 
of the article, may be appropriate as a valid trade-
mark." Vol. 52, American Jurisprudence, page 
544. 
Certainly the word ttbracer" is only remotely de-
scriptive of such products as skin lotions and hair tonics, 
in fact, under all modern meanings of the word, it is not 
descriptive at all of such products. 
uNames or marks which merely to some ex-
tent suggest the character, quality or ingredients 
of an article, or some supposed advantage to be 
derived from using it, or some effect to be pro-
duced by its use, or the locality of its origin, have 
been ordinarily upheld as valid trade-marks. The 
validity of a trade-mark ends where suggestion 
ends and description begins." 63 Corpus Juris, 
page 353. 
uwhile it is the general rule that a word which 
is merely descriptive of the article on which it is 
used, or of its ingredients or characteristics, cannot 
be a valid trademark. The rule does not necessarily 
exclude words which are suggestive of ingredients 
or quality." LeBlume Import Co., Inc. vs. Coty, 
(Supra). 
ccGenerally, the courts will not enjoin the use 
of a name consisting solely of generic· terms, but it 
may do so where its use would be confusing and 
misleading." Brown vs. Hook, (Calif.), 180 Pac. 
(2nd) 982; 79 Calif. App. (2nd) 781. 
The Restatement of the Law, Torts, Division 3, sec-
tion 717, page 562 analyzes the elements necessary to con-
stitute a prima facie case of infringement of a trade name 
as follows: 
15 
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uOne infringes another's trade. na~e, if_ (a) 
without a privilege to do so, he uses tn hts busmess, 
in the manner of a trade·-mark or trade name, a 
designation which is identical with or confusingly 
similar to the other's trade name, though he does 
not use the designation for ~he purpose of decep-
tion, and (h) the other's interest in his trade name 
is protected with reference to (i) the goods, serv-
ices or business· in connection with which the actor 
uses his designation, and (ii) the markets in which 
the actor uses his designation. 
Paragraphs seven and eight of the complaint set forth 
heretofore and on file (R.3-4) herein allege that the name 
of the product being distributed by the respondents and 
the trade name of the appellant's product are confusing 
the buying public and will continue to mislead appellant's 
customers, and for the purposes of the demurrer the Dis-
trict Court must assume these allegations to be absolutely 
true. Therefore, applying the above rule of Brown vs. 
Hook (supra) the District Court should grant the injunc-
tion prayed for in the appellant's complaint, upon appel-
lant's proving the facts alleged therein to the effect that 
the public is, and will be, misled. 
uAccording to some authorities, there is a 
distinction between the use of a name which mere .. 
ly describes the business a~d its generic in its na-
ture, and a name which, although descriptive of a 
business, neve·rtheless depends upon a :figure of 
speech and association of ideas, and is not merely a 
literal description of a business. In the latter case, 
where the name is novel, unusual, or fanciful, it 
may ?e ~ppropriated ~y a trader, even though it is 
descrtpttve of the hustness he carries on." Vol. 52, 
Am. Jur., page 545. 
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ttWhether a name claimed as a trademark is 
subject to the objection of being descriptive, or 
whether it is an arbitrary or fancy name,, must de-
pend on the circumstances of each case as it arises., 
52 Am. Jur., pages 546-547. 
Applying the above universally followed rule, the Dis-
trict Court by sustaining the respondents' general demur-
rer, denied the appellant any opportunity to show any of 
the circumstances of this particular matter, since the com-
plaint quite properly only alleged ultimate facts. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the word 
ubracer" is descriptive of the hair tonic or skin lotion busi ... 
ness, which we most strenuously deny, the Court must next 
determine whether the appellant has obtained the right to 
enjoin competitors and potential competitors .. from con-
fusing the public by the use of the word under the doc-
trine of usecondary meaning." By sustaining the demur-
rer, the Court refused appellant an opportunity to prove 
that the appellant's mentioned trade name had obtained 
sufficient significance in the public mind to come within 
the application of the aforesaid doctrine. As we have 
said, the Court on the hearing of a demurrer must deem 
each and every allegation of the complaint to be true for 
the purposes of ruling upon the demurrer. Therefore, 
there can be no argument, it is absolutely true and can-
not be questioned, at this time, that the allegations from 
paragraphs five, seven and eight (R. 2-4) of the complaint 
are true. The allegations in these three pa-ragraphs in 
words and effect show that from August 31, 1925 until 
now the appellant has been engaged in an extensive and 
profitable hair tonic and skin lotion manufacturing and 
selling business in Utah, that said hair tonic and skin lotion 
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is manufactured under the trade name of uBrace For The 
Hair, A Real Bracer For the Hair," that by reason of the 
manner in which appellant has conducted his business it 
has acquired and now commands an extensive patronage 
and has goodwill in the state under the said trade name, that 
the trade name of the product, ((Skin Bracer," sold and 
distributed in Utah by respondents is so similar to the said 
trade name long used by appellant for his product that 
they have appropriated to their own use and benefit the 
said goodwill of appellant's business and have deluded the 
appellant's customers and the public in general into the 
belief that the two products of the respective parties are 
one and the same product, that to continue to allow re-
spondents to sell a skin lotion in Utah with the word 
ubracer" in the trade name will deceive, mislead and de-
fraud the appellant's customers and prospective customers 
into believing the article sold by respondents is the same 
article as that which is manufactured and sold by plaintiff, 
that unless restrained respondents will continue and pro-
ceed to carry on the business of selling a skin lotion under 
a trade name which has and will create much confusion 
in appellant's business, and that appellant has no adequate 
remedy at law. Each and every one of the foregoing facts 
must be deemed to be true by the Court, and the District 
Court has held that it cannot grant appellant equitable 
relief in spite of the unquestioned truth of the same. No 
other allegation is necessary to apply the doctrine of usec-
ondary meaning." To show that other courts and authori-
ties have· disagreed with the District Court and granted re-
lief, under the doctrine of ((secondary meaning," we cite 
the following authorities and case: 
ult i~ settled law that words to which no right 
of exclusive use may be acquired, such as generic 
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terms, descriptive words, and geographical of prop-
er names, may be·come so associated in the public 
mind with the goods or business of some one person 
as to acquire a secondary meaning; in which case 
no other person may use them without clearly in-
dicating that his goods or business are not the same 
as those to which such terms have become as-
sociated." 40 A.L.R. 43 3. 
uThe term ttradename' is used in various 
senses.. Thus, it has sometimes been used· to indicate 
a mark affixed to goods where such mark is not 
originally susceptible of exclusive appropriation, 
but has acquired a secondary meaning." 52 Am. 
Jur. page 509. 
ttA protectible right in the use for trade pur-
poses of a word in common use may be acquired 
under the doctrine of secondary meaning." 52 
Am. Jur., page 509. 
uEven though a word or combination of words 
is incapable of becoming a valid trademark, yet, if 
it has by a sufficiently long and exclusive use 
acquired such a secondary meaning as to indicate 
in the trade that the goods to which it is applied are 
made by a particular manufacturer, or are put on 
the market by a particular vendor, its use by an-
other or similar goods in such a way as to be likely 
to deceive purchasers will be· restrained as unfair 
competition; and its use, even in its primary mean-
ing, will be so limited as to prevent the working of 
a probable deception by passing off the goods of one 
maker as those of another. And some cases even 
have referred to a name which has acquired such a 
meaning as in the ·case of a geographical name, as a 
valid trademark." 26 R. C. L., Trademarks, Sec. 
61, page 886. 
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uThe trademark ccoca-Cola' has become so 
identified with the product of a particula_r comp~ny 
as to have acq·uired a secondary meaning, whtch 
will be protected in the courts despite ~ny weak-
ness there may be in the name as a technical trade-
mark. Whether the name (Cleo-Cola' is, as used 
by defendant so similar to the trademark (Coca-
Cola' that the former will probably deceive pur-
chasers and cause them to buy the former product 
in the belief that it is the latter is a question of 
fa·ct." Cleo Syrup Corp. vs. Coca-Cola Co. 139 
Fed. (2nd) 416; 150 A.L.R. 1056. 
We submit that even though the word ccbracer" were 
a descriptive of generic word as it pertains to appellant's 
business, which it is not under modern usage, the appel-
lant's complaint alleges facts showing such an old, well-
established, publicly known, constant, extensive and 
profitable business under his trade name that he has al-
leged every element necessary to show a right to relief 
under the doctrine of usecondary meaning." 
The following are some examples of words which 
are adjectives which the courts have upheld as valid trade 
names:. 
((Landlords' Protective Bureau" infringed by 
uLandlords' Protective Department," Koebel vs. 
Chicago Landlords' Protective Bureau, 210 Ill. 176; 
71 N.E. 362; 112 Ill. App. 21. 
uLittle Shop" infringed by ccLittle Antique Shop," 
C. C. White Co. vs. Miller, 50 Fed. 277. 
ccMoxie Nerve Food" infringed by uStandard Nerve 
Food," Moxie Nerve Food Co. vs. Baumbach, 32 
Fed. 205. 
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uNational Folding Box & Paper Co." infringed by 
uNational Folding Box Co." National Folding 
Box & Paper Co. vs. National Folding Box Co., 43 
W.R. 156. 
uold Crow" infringed by uWhite Crow," W. A. 
Gaines & Co. vs. Leslie, 54 N.Y. Supp. 421. 
uRubberset" infringed by uRubberbound," Rub-
ber & Celluloid, H. T. Co. vs. Rubberbound Brush 
Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 419 ; 8 8 Atl. 21 0. 
ccDr. Williams' Pink Pills For Pale People,", in-
fringed by uDr. Wilson's Pink Pills For Anaemic 
People~" Dr. Williams' Medical Company vs. Tot-
hill, Cape Good Hope, 20. S.C. 483; 21 S.· C. 589. 
((Holeproof" infringed by uNo-Hole," Holeproof 
Hosiery Co. vs. Fitts, 167 Fed. 378. 
uKeepclean" infringed by uSta-Kleen," Florence 
Mfg. Co. vs. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed.· 73, 101 
C.C.A. 7. .. 
uPep-0-Mint" infringed by uPeptomint," L. P~ 
·Larson, Jr. Co. vs. Lamont, Corliss & Co., 257 Fed. 
270; C.C.A. 7. 
... uRubberset" infringed by uSet In Rubber," Rubber 
& Celluloid, H. T. Co. vs. F. W. De Voe & C. T. 
Reynolds Co., 233 Fed. 150 . 
· uSix Little Taylors" infringed by uSix Big Taylors/' 
Mossier vs. Jacobs, 6 5 Ill. App. 5 71. 
uwearever" infringed by ((Everlasting," Alumi-
num Cooking Utensil Co. vs. National Aluminum 
Works, 226Fed.815 . 
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uElastic Seam" infringed by uStretchiseam," J. 
A. Scriven Co. vs. Girard Co., 140 Fed. 794. 
uHome" infringed by uHome Delight," New 
Home Sewing Machine Co. vs. Bloomingdale, 59 
Fed. 284. 
((Manufacturers' Outlet Co.'' infringed by uTaun-
ton Outlet Co.," Samuels vs. Spitzer, 177 Mass. 
226; 58 N.E. 693. 
uMechanics' Store" infringed by uMechanical 
Store," Weinstock, Lubin & Co. vs. Marks, 42 Pac. 
142; 109 Calif. 529; 30 L. R. A. 182. 
There can be no argument, admittedly, that the 
manufacturer of steel braces for bridges could not prevent 
his competitors from using the word ((brace" or ubracer" 
to describe their business or products because the word is 
descriptive of their product and the competitors would be 
denied the important right of describing their respective 
products to ·customers and the public if the word were 
thus restricted. Nor do we maintain, that the law would 
restrict persons manufacturing or selling hairdressing from 
the· use of the word utonic" to describe their product, be-
cause a competitor registered the word. However, we do 
maintain that the appellant's competitors have lost no right 
to describe their products, though it be a hair tonic, skin 
lotion or cosmetic, merely because the appellant has re-
stricted them from using the word ~(bracer," since the 
word ubracer," as it pertains to the appellant's business 
and the respondents' businesses and their competitors' busi-
nesses is not descriptive of such businesses-the word is 
fanciful and arbitrary under modern meanings when used 
in the manner the appellant has registered it. 
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The respondents, at the hearing of their demurrer, 
also half-heartedly argued that the appellant and respond-
ents are not in fact competitors, and for that reason the 
appellant is not entitled to the relief demanded by him in 
the prayer of his said complaint. The complaint in para-
graph seven (R. 3) , and elsewhere in the said pleading, has 
alleged that all parties herein are in the competitive busi-
ness of selling and distributing skin lotions, and respond-
ents must deny this allegation, if they could, by answer 
and not by demurrer. The Court must assume the allega-
tions to be true, while determining the demurrer, that the 
parties both sell products designed for the same use in the 
same territory-not that the parties need, however, to be 
in immediate competition before the courts can restrain 
one from the use of the others valid trade name. The 
Restatement of the Law, Torts, Division 3, page 599, sec-
tion 730 (b) gives the best digest of the law on the sub-
ject of who can be restrained from use of a trade name as 
follows: 
uWhile the class of goods, services or business 
with reference to which the interest in a trade mark 
or trade name is protected has been greatly expand-
ed, the class is nevertheless limited. The interest 
is not protected against the use of a similar desig-
nation for any goods, service or business. It is 
protected only within the limits fixed by the likeli-
hood of confusion of prospective purchasers. The 
issue of each case is whether goods, services or busi-
nesses of the actor and of the other are sufficiently 
related so that the alleged infringement would sub-
ject the good-will and reputation of the other's 
trademark or trade name to the hazards of the 
actor's business. If pancake syrup is marketed 
under a designation confusingly similar to a trade-
mark for pancake flour, it is clear that the market 
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reputation of the flour is subject to the hazards of 
the market reputation of the syrup since both prod-
ucts are bought by substantially the same pur-
chasers for use together. But, if lipsticks are 
marketed under a designation confusingly similar 
to a trade-mark for steam shovels, it is not likely 
that the market reputation of the steam shovels 
would thereby share in the market vicissitudes of 
the lipsticks. The test here, as on the issue of con-
fusing similarity, is the probable reaction of pro-
spective purchasers." 
Applying th~ test set forth in ·the above quote, and 
even assuming that appellant manufactured only a hair 
tonic and respondents sold only an after-shave lotion, 
would not both of these products be sold at the men's cos-
metic counter, would the public be surprised if one manu-
facturer made two such products, would not many of the 
same customers use both products, and are not both prod-
ucts apt to be retailed from many of the same outlets? 
James Love Hopkins in his treatise entitled, uThe Law Of 
Trademarks, Tradenames & Unfair Competition, Fourth 
Edition," seems to agree with the Restatement's rule and 
says on page 3 7 6 as follows: 
«'In determining whether unfair competition 
exists, it is necessary to determine whether the 
parties are competitors in business. In considering 
the defense that the parties were not engaged in 
competition in business, where plaintiff was a miller 
and flour dealer and the defendant a baker, Jud.,ge 
Anderson (in Potter-W rightington, Inc. vs. Ward 
Baking Co., 288 Fed. 597-601) disposed of the de-
fense accurately and tersely as follows: «But both 
are seeking to enlarge their markets by attracting 
the ultimate consumer of wheat, mainly eaters of 
bread.'" 
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In the case before the Court, if the matter had been 
allowed to go to trial, the trial court would have the duty 
to determine whether, as a question of fact, the trade name, 
uBrace For The Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair" and 
the trade name, ((Skin Bracer" are sufficiently similar to 
cause possible confusion in the mind of a potential pur~ 
chaser of the former product. Actual confusion is not 
necessary as shown in the following quote: 
uln order to establish trade-mark infringement 
or unfair competition, it was not necessary that 
plaintiff should prove actual confusion of goods." 
California Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n. vs. 
H. R. Nicholson Co., 15 8 Pac. (2nd) 7 64; 69 Calif. 
App. (2nd) 207. 
uT o entitle a party to injunctive relief against 
the deceptive and injurious use of its tradename 
which has allegedly acquired a secondary meaning, 
it is not necessary that the parties be in competitive 
business or that the injury has already occurred, but 
it is sufficient if the names, although not identical, 
are sufficiently similar to cause confusion and 
injury." Academy of Motion Picture Arts & 
Sciences vs. Benson, 1 04 Pac. (2nd) 6 50; 15 Cal. 
(2nd) 685. 
However, the appellant in paragraphs seven and eight 
(R. 3-4) of his complaint has alleged that there has been 
and will be confusion upon the part of appellant's custom-
ers and upon the part of the public itself. Only after 
hearing the appellant's evidence can a court determine 
fairly whether the names are so similar as to there being a 
possibility of confusion. In support of this contention we 
cite the following cases and authorities: 
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ult is a mere matter of judgment whether or 
not the word-symbol and the representation would 
convey to the mind of the ordinary purchaser the 
same thing." Digest of Decision of La~ & Prac-
tice in the Patent Office and The Un1ted States 
and State Courts in Patents, Trade-Marks, Copy-
rights & Labels by W. L. Pollard, page 524. 
((What similarity is sufficient for a party to 
benefit himself by the good name of another must 
be determined in each case by its own circum-
stances, and generally a similarity which would be 
likely to deceive or mislead an ordinary unsuspect-
ing customer is obnoxious to the law." Academy 
of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences vs. Benson 
(supra). 
((To entitle the owner of a trade-mark or 
trade-name to an injunction, it is not essential that 
the mark or name used be the same, if it be so simi-
lar that purchasers would be liable to be misled." ! 
LeBlume Import Co., Inc. vs. Coty et al., 293 Fed. 
344; 292 Fed. 264. 
The appellant's complaint has certainly alleged facts 
sufficient to show that he conformed with all acts neces-
sary in the year 19 2 5 in order to register his trade name, 
by the alle·gations in paragraph five (R. 2) and the certi-
fied copy of the application for registration (R. S-6) des-
ignated as uExhibit A" and attached to and by reference 
(R. 3) made a part of said complaint. The statute con-
trolling the registration of trademarks in the year 1925 is 
cited in the Compiled Laws of Utah for 1907 as section 
2721, page 927 and in the Compiled Laws of Utah for 
1917 as section 6146, page 119 8, and reads as follows: 
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uAny person, association or union may record 
his or its claim to the same, and a copy or description 
of such trademark or name, with his affidavit 
attached thereto, certified by any officer authorized 
to take acknowledgments of conveyance, setting 
forth that he, or the firm, corporation, association, 
or union of which he is a member, is the exclusive 
owner, or agent of the owner, of such trade mark 
or name.'' 
The above statute remained in effect until March 6, 1931, 
when the Nineteenth Regular Session of the Utah State 
Legislature passed House Bill number 57 (Chapter 16 on 
page 17 of the Session Laws of Utah for 1931). The pres-
ent statute in effect, Title 95, Chapter 2, Section 95-2-1, 
of the Utah Code Annotated for ·1943 is almost ide·ntical to 
the above section (in fact, the editor of the said Code er-
roneously states in the annotations that the sections are 
identical) in words and effect, but the present statute re-
quires publication of the intended registered trade name. 
The respondents need not have had actual knowledge 
of the fact that appellant had appropriated the trade name 
that, as aforesaid, he now does business under. In support 
of this statement we cite from the following case: 
((Actual knowledge of plaintiff's prior appro-
priation of the trade name and design is immaterial 
in an action to restrain infringement; registration 
being ·constructive notice.'' Hall vs. Holstrom. 287 
Pac. 668 ~ 106 Cal. App. 563. 
The Restatement of the Law, Torts, Division 3, sec-
tion 731 sets forth certain tests which the Court should 
apply to appellant's complaint to determine whether ap-
pellant has alleged sufficient facts to allege a course of ac-
tion. Section 731, page 600, reads as follows: 
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uln determining whether one's interest in a 
trade-mark or tradename· is protected, under the 
rules stated in section 717 (supra) and section 
73o~· with reference to the goods, services or busi-
ness in connection with which the actor uses his 
designation, the following facts are important: 
u (a) the likelihood that the actor's goods, 
services or business will be mistake·n for those of the 
other; 
(C: (b) the likelihood that the other may expand 
his business so as to compete with the actor; 
u. (c) the extent to which the goods or services 
of the actor and those of the other have common 
purchasers or use·rs; 
u (d) the en tent to which the goods or services 
of the actor and those of the other are marketed 
through the same channels; 
u (e) the relation between the functions of the 
goods or services of the actor and those of the other; 
u (f) the degree of distinctiveness of the 
trade-mark or trade name; 
u (g) the degree of attention usually given 
to the trade symbols in the purchase of goods or 
services of the actor and those of the other; 
*Section 730 (page 596). uThe interest in a trade-
mark or tradename is protected under the rule 
stated in '§717 with reference only to (a) compet-
ing goods, services in business and . (b) other goods, 
services or business which in view of .the designation 
are use·d. by the actor, likely to be regarded by 
prospective purchasers as associated with the source 
identified by the trade mark or trade name." 
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u (h) the length of time during which the 
actor has used the designation; 
u (i) the intent of the actor in adopting and 
using the designation." 
Every one of the nine above tests can be applied to the 
appellant's complaint to show his right to have the in-
fringement of his trade name restrained, but since we 
have heretofore shown in this brief wherein each test ap-
plies favorably to appellant, we shall not be· tedious by 
repeating our stand again. 
ERROR NUMBER TWO· 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS. IN ERROR 
WHEN IT RENDERED AND ENTERED ITS OR-
DER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE HEREIN DIS-
MISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT. 
Naturally, as we have stated heretofore, we are con-
vinced that the District Court was in error when it sus-
tained the demurrer of the respondents. Consequently, if 
the complaint states facts sufficient to state a good cause 
of action, the court was in error in dismissing the com-
plaint without the consent of appellant until the matter 
had been tried. The above statements are too obvious to 
press further. 
The District Court also was in error in dismissing the 
complaint as to the two parties-defendant not before the 
Court. The District Court had no jurisdiction over de-
fendants, The Mennen Company and John Doe; conse-
quently the District Court had no authority to dismiss 
the complaint as against all defendants. The appellant 
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should still within the time prescribed by statute be per-
mitted to serve said two defendants, or either of them, 
with a copy of a summons to which a true copy of said 
complaint on file herein has been attached and proceed 
against said two defendants, or either of them. However, 
the District Court dismissed the complaint as against all 
defendants by not naming the respondents (R. 9) so ap-
pellant has been denied his legal right to proceed against 
the said two defendants, The Mennen Company and John 
Doe, upon finding them in the State of Utah, without ap-
pellant assuming the additional work and expense of com-
mencing a new action and :filing a new complaint. The 
District Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint 
as the same effected the said two defendants until each of 
the said two defendants made an appearance before the 
Court and requested such action of the District Court by 
some proper motion or demurrer or pleading. 
CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, respectfully conclude that the judg7' 
ment (R. 9) and order of the District Court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted~ 
RAYMOND R. BRADY 
JOHN HAYS O'DONNELL 
Attorneys for appellant. 
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